## IRAN TASK FORCE

## Parameters of an Acceptable Agreement June 2014

Despite current negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran, there are concerns that the Islamic Republic of Iran's long-term objectives remain at odds with America's core interests in the Middle East. Iran is a leading sponsor of terrorism and has done much to damage America's allies in the region. At home, the theocratic regime continues to repress its citizens and deny them their basic human rights. The question then becomes, what kind of a nuclear program is such a state entitled to?

**Nuclear Program:** The bipartisan Senate legislation S.1881, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act, has already delineated important terms that should be included in an agreement. We concur that any accord must:

- **1.** *dismantle Iran's illicit nuclear infrastructure*, including enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and facilities, the heavy water reactor and production plant at Arak, and any nuclear weapon components and technology, so that Iran is precluded from a nuclear breakout capability and prevented from pursuing both uranium and plutonium pathways to a nuclear weapon;
- **2.** with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), resolve all issues of past and present concern, including possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program; and
- **3.** require Iran's full implementation of and compliance with the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973, including modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to that Agreement and ratification and implementation of the Protocol Additional to that Agreement, done at Vienna December 18, 2003.

Terms that we insist beyond these are as follows:

1. The agreement should not be subject to a sun-set clause. The Joint Plan of Action agreed upon in November 2013 stipulated that a final agreement would "have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon," and that "following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT." Thus, at some point, all special restrictions on the Iranian program lapse and the Islamic Republic can proceed to construct an elaborate, industrial-size program featuring both enrichment and plutonium capabilities subject only to the same peaceful-purpose limitations and verification requirements that apply to countries whose peaceful nuclear intentions are not in doubt. The special restrictions negotiated on Iran's program have to be permanent and not lapse after a period of time.

- **2.** The inspection regime has to go beyond the existing authorities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). South Africa offers an important model as the IAEA was allowed access to personnel and facilities, including military ones that it suspected might be involved in nuclear research. This means an inspection team will be permanently based in Iran and can, without delay, access any facility, equipment, persons, and documents it deems suspicious.
- **3.** Iran has to suspend its nuclear program as demanded by a series of UN Security Council resolutions. The agreement should bring Iran into compliance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions related to Iran's nuclear program, including Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010), with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the Security Council's consideration of matters relating to Iran's nuclear program. The period of suspension, however, has not been defined by those resolutions. It is important to insist that the suspension period at minimum be co-terminus with the time it will take the IAEA to certify that Iran is in compliance with all of its NPT obligations. And this must include a full-accounting of all previous weaponization activities.

*It is very important for members of Congress to define the parameters of an acceptable* agreement before one is actually negotiated. Stipulating such terms in a stalled bill is not sufficient. Members should go on the record—individually and collectively—to declare what they would view as a proper accord.

The objective of U.S. policy must be a serious and permanent reversal of Iran's nuclear *capacity.* However, the terms of any final agreement are unlikely to address outstanding concerns regarding Iran's support for terrorism, threatening and destabilizing behavior towards its neighbors, and systematic human rights abuses. In addition to an agreement based on the parameters above, Iran should also be pressed to cease its support for terrorism and terrorist groups, to stop subverting its neighbors, and to honor international norms on treatment of its citizens. Addressing these other arenas of Iranian violations of international law will not only garner regional support for the agreement but also send a message to the Iranian people that the United States is concerned about human rights not just nuclear physics.

The Iran Task Force's goal is to lend expertise on Iran's internal politics, nuclear science, and sanctions regime to the legislative branch. By providing the necessary intellectual capital, this group can help to strengthen Congress's role in a potential final nuclear agreement with Iran. This group of former government officials and nuclear, legal, and sanctions experts provides advice and recommendations to policymakers in order to ensure that any final deal prevents Iran's uranium and plutonium pathways to a nuclear weapon.

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IRAN TASK FORCE 2